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U.C.L.A. Law Review			 		
Rewriting Whren v. United States
Devon W. Carbado & Jonathan Feingold

ABSTRACT
In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Whren v. United States—a unanimous opinion in which
the Court effectively constitutionalized racial profiling. Despite its enduring consequences, Whren
remains good law today. This Article rewrites the opinion. We do so, in part, to demonstrate how
one might incorporate racial justice concerns into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a body of
law that has long elided and marginalized the racialized dimensions of policing. A separate aim is
to reveal the “false necessity” of the Whren outcome. The fact that Whren was unanimous, and that
even progressive Justices signed on, might lead one to conclude that the Court’s hands were tied.
This Article argues otherwise by offering an alternative Supreme Court opinion that could have
decided the case. In the context of doing so, the Article limits its archive—the materials on which
it formally relies—to sources that were available to the Court when the case was litigated. We
do not pretend that this citational practice fully avoids the pitfalls of presentism. To be perfectly
transparent, how we view Whren is very much informed by the broad literature that has emerged
over the past two decades arguing that the case was wrongly decided. Still, that we have limited
our archive along the preceding lines strengthens the case that the Court could have reached a
different conclusion—within the confines of Fourth Amendment law—that took the dignity and
sanctity of Black lives more seriously. We have written the opinion in the voice of the late Justice
Thurgood Marshall, whose constitutional jurisprudence routinely centered the experiences of the
marginalized, the minoritized, and the forgotten.

AUTHOR
Devon W. Carbado is the Harry Pregerson Professor of Law at the University of California, Los
Angeles School of Law.
Jonathan Feingold is an Associate Professor at Boston University School of Law. Professor Feingold
received his B.A. from Vassar College and J.D. from UCLA School of Law.
This essay is part of a broader scholarly project that rewrites central Supreme Court Cases to better
attend to racial inequality. See Critical Race Judgements: Rewritten U.S. Court Opinions on Race
and Law (Bennett Capers, Devon Carbado, Robin Lenhardt & Angela Onwuachi-Willig eds.)
(forthcoming 2022). As we indicated in the abstract, in rewriting Whren, we did not expressly rely
on materials that were published after the original Whren opinion was decided. Still, we recognize
that our approach to the case was shaped by scholarship and ideas that circulated post-Whren.
68 UCLA L. Rev. 1678 (2022)
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Indeed, many of the ideas draw from two papers one of us (Devon Carbado) wrote, both of which
were published subsequent to the Whren decision: (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich.
L. Rev. 946 (2002) and From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment
Pathways to Police Violence, 105 Calif. L. Rev. 125 (2017).
Those pieces, in turn, drew from a robust body of scholarship on race and the Fourth Amendment,
including: Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 245 (2010); Gabriel
J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable But Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical
Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 882 (2015); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops
and Traﬃc Stops, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 425 (1997); Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody & Donald
Haider-Markel, Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship (2014); Samuel R.
Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101
Mich. L. Rev. 651 (2003); Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the Fourth Amendment,
36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1413 (2013); David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traﬃc
Oﬀenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 554 (1997); Kevin
R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. BrignoniPonce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 Geo. L.J. 1005
(2010); Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traﬃc Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not
Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843 (2004); Margaret Lawton, State Responses to the
Whren Decision, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1039 (2016); Nancy Leong, The Open Road and the Traﬃc
Stop: Narratives and Counter-Narratives of the American Dream, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 305 (2012); Tracey
Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333 (1998); David A. Sklansky, Traﬃc
Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 271; Jordan B.
Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traﬃc Stops, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 672 (2015).
For comments on or conversations about the Essay, we thank Mario Barnes, Bennett Capers, Paul
Butler, Beth Colgan, Kimberlé Crenshaw, Robin Lenhardt, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, and Richard Re.
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WHREN V. UNITED STATES

OPINION OF THE COURT
Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.

I.
In this case, we decide whether it is consistent with the Fourth Amendment
for a police officer who observed a traffic violation to use that violation to justify a
racially selective traffic stop, or as the pretext to investigate a crime for which the
officer lacks probable cause. We answer both questions in the negative.

II.
On the evening of June 10, 1993, a team of District of Columbia (D.C.)
plainclothes vice officers were patrolling for drug activity in an unmarked car.
Investigator Tony Howard drove the vehicle, in which officers Efrain Soto, Jr. and
Homer Littlejohn were also present.1 While driving in Southeast D.C., the officers
noticed two Black men sitting in a dark Nissan Pathfinder paused at a stop sign.
The Pathfinder had temporary tags. Officer Soto testified that he had observed
James Lester Brown, the driver, looking into the lap of Michael Whren, the
passenger. As the officers proceeded slowly down the street, Soto continued to
watch the Pathfinder. He testified that the Pathfinder remained stopped at the
intersection for more than twenty seconds, obstructing traffic behind it.2
Investigator Howard had already begun to make a U-turn to tail the
Pathfinder when Soto instructed him to follow it. As the officers turned around,
the Pathfinder turned without signaling. Officer Soto added that the Pathfinder
“sped off quickly” and proceeded at an “unreasonable speed.”3
The vice officers followed the Pathfinder to a different intersection, where it
was surrounded by cars to its front, right, and rear. The officers boxed in the

1.
2.

3.

United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff’d sub nom. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
Officers Soto and Littlejohn disagreed as to whether any cars were stopped behind the
Pathfinder. Soto testified that at least one car was stopped behind the Pathfinder, but
acknowledged that no car behind the Pathfinder honked or otherwise requested the Pathfinder
to move. Officer Littlejohn testified that there were no vehicles waiting behind the Pathfinder.
Brief for the Petitioners at *4–5, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (No. 95-5841).
Id. at *5–6 (quoting the District Court transcript).
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Pathfinder by pulling alongside its driver’s side. Officer Soto then immediately
exited his vehicle and approached the Pathfinder, identifying himself as a police
officer. Officer Littlejohn followed a few steps behind.
Because the surrounding vehicles prevented Brown from pulling over,
Officer Soto told Brown to place the Pathfinder in park. As he was speaking, Soto
noticed that Whren was holding two large, clear plastic bags. Upon seeing the
bags, which Soto suspected to contain cocaine, the officer yelled “C.S.A.” to notify
the other officers that he had observed a Controlled Substances Act violation.4
According to Officer Soto, as he reached for the driver’s side door, Whren
yelled “pull off, pull off.”5 Officer Soto then observed Whren pull the cover off a
power window control panel in the passenger door and place one of the large bags
into a hidden compartment. Officer Soto opened the driver’s side door, dove across
Brown, and grabbed the other bag from Whren’s left hand. At the same moment,
Officer Littlejohn pinned Brown to the driver’s seat.
Multiple officers then arrested Brown and Whren and proceeded to search
the Pathfinder. The officers recovered two tinfoil packets containing marijuana
laced with PCP, a bag of chunky white rocks, a large white rock of crack cocaine,
numerous unused Ziplock bags, a portable phone, and personal papers.
Petitioners were charged in a four-count indictment for violating various federal
drug laws, including 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a) and 860(a).

III.
At a pretrial suppression hearing, petitioners challenged the legality of the
stop and the resulting seizure of the drugs. They argued that the officers lacked
probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion, to believe that petitioners were
engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity. Petitioners further argued that Officer
Soto’s asserted ground for approaching the vehicle was pretextual.
Petitioners advanced two separate pretext claims. First, petitioners alleged
that the stop was racially motivated—that is, the officers stopped petitioners
because they were Black, not because they committed a traffic infraction. Second,
petitioners alleged that the officers’ actual reason for stopping them was
investigatory—that is, the officers stopped petitioners to investigate whether they
possessed drugs, not to enforce the vehicle code.
To support the foregoing claims, petitioners explained that under normal
circumstances, D.C. vice officers do not concern themselves with mundane traffic

4.
5.

Id. at *8 (quoting the District Court transcript).
Id.
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violations. According to the D.C. police regulations, plainclothes officers are
permitted to make traffic stops “only in the case of a violation that is so grave as to
pose an immediate threat to the safety of others.”6 Vice officers, on the other hand,
have a mandate to “find narcotics activity going on.”7 Testifying at the District
Court, Officer Soto elaborated: “The only circumstances that I would issue
tickets . . . is for just reckless, reckless driving, something that in my personal view
would somehow endanger the safety of anybody who’s walking around the street
or even the occupants of a vehicle, maybe children or whoever.”8
It appears clear that after Brown took a turn without signaling, the officers
lacked any objective reason (probable cause or reasonable suspicion) to believe
that Brown or Whren had done anything other than commit a minor traffic
infraction. Nor is there evidence to suggest that the officers could have believed
that the traffic infraction constituted “a violation that is so grave as to pose an
immediate threat to the safety of others.”9
When asked why he stopped the Pathfinder, Officer Soto testified that the
driver was “not paying full time and attention to his driving.”10 Officer Soto made
clear that he never intended to issue a ticket for any traffic infractions. Rather, he
wished to stop the Pathfinder to inquire why it was obstructing traffic and why it
sped off without signaling in a school area. When questioned, Officer Soto testified
that the decision to stop the Pathfinder was not based upon the “racial profile” of
Brown and Whren, but rather on the driver’s behavior.11
The District Court denied petitioners’ suppression motion. It concluded
that “the facts of the stop were not controverted” and “[t]here was nothing to
really demonstrate that the actions of the officers were contrary to a normal traffic
stop.”12 Subsequently, petitioners were convicted of the subject counts.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The panel concluded that
“regardless of whether a police officer subjectively believes that the occupants
of an automobile may be engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic stop
is permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could
have stopped the car for the suspected traffic violation.”13 We granted
certiorari.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at *4a add. (emphasis added).
Id. at *4 (quoting the District Court transcript).
Id. at *7 (quoting the District Court transcript).
Id. at *4a add.
Id. at *4–5 (quoting the District Court transcript).
Id. at *10 n.11 (quoting the District Court transcript).
Id. at 9 (quoting the District Court opinion).
United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4081289

Rewriting Whren v. United States

1683

IV.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” When police temporarily detain an
individual during an automobile stop, even if brief and for a limited purpose, it
constitutes a “seizure” of “persons” under the Fourth Amendment.14 Accordingly,
such stops must be “reasonable” to pass constitutional scrutiny.15 Under most
circumstances, it is reasonable for the police to conduct such a stop if they have
probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.16 We hold today,
however, that certain traffic stops remain unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment even when probable cause of a traffic infraction exists.
The petitioners concede that Officer Soto had probable cause to believe that
they had violated various D.C. traffic codes.17 They argue, however, that our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not—and should not—condone a rule
that states that all traffic stops conducted with probable cause are per se
“reasonable.” Specifically, the petitioners contend that “in the unique context of
civil traffic regulations” probable cause is not always enough.18
Because automobile use is so heavily and minutely regulated that it is nearly
impossible to comply with all traffic and safety rules all the time, the petitioners
contend that a police officer could almost invariably catch a motorist in a technical
violation. Accordingly, if evidence of a traffic infraction always satisfies
constitutional requirements, police officers would enjoy a level of discretion that
invites the sort of governmental abuses that the Fourth Amendment is designed to
prevent.
Specifically, the petitioners allege that holding all such stops “reasonable”
would provide cover for law enforcement officers to stop drivers for decidedly
unreasonable reasons, such as the driver’s race. Moreover, they suggest that such a

14.
15.
16.

17.

18.

See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 556–58 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 (“[T]he reasonableness standard usually requires, at a minimum,
that the facts upon which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement against ‘an objective
standard,’ whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test.” (footnotes omitted));
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (per curiam).
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, §§ 2213.4 (“An operator shall . . . give full time and attention to the
operation of the vehicle”), 2204.3 (“No person shall turn any vehicle . . . without giving an
appropriate signal”), 2200.3 (“No person shall drive a vehicle . . . at a speed greater than is
reasonable and prudent under the conditions”) (1995).
Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 1, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (No. 955841).
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rule would embolden police to conduct pretextual stops used to investigate
unlawful conduct for which the officers have no reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to believe has occurred. To avoid this danger, petitioners argue that the
Fourth Amendment test for traffic stops should not simply ask if an officer had
probable cause to justify a stop, but whether that stop is indeed reasonable.
We agree.
We first explain why enforcing traffic laws in a racially discriminatory
manner is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—even if officers have
probable cause that a traffic violation occurred. We then discuss why pretextual
stops, whereby officers employ traffic stops to investigate unrelated crimes for
which they lack probable cause, are also unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
A.
Racialized policing is one of the most pernicious and enduring forms of statesanctioned racism and remains a core feature of this nation’s history.19 The formal
policing of African Americans stretches back at least as far as the slave codes, which
codified into law extreme deprivations of life and liberty, and lay a legal
groundwork for slave patrols—themselves a state-sanctioned tool to suppress
antislavery resistance.20 In a 1904 essay on the topic, W. E. B. Du Bois detailed how
slave patrols formed a critical part of slavery’s overarching framework:
[T]he private well-ordering and control of slaves called for careful cooperation among masters. The fear of insurrection was ever before the
South . . . . [and the] result was a system of rural police . . . whose work it
was to stop the nocturnal wandering and meeting of slaves. It was
usually an effective organization, which terrorized the slaves, and to

19.

20.

Regrettably, this Court has long been complicit in various forms of racial inequality. See
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 391 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(describing how soon after Reconstruction, “with the assistance of this Court, the Negro was
rapidly stripped of his new civil rights”); id. at 402 (“After the Civil War our Government
started several ‘affirmative action’ programs. This Court in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy
v. Ferguson destroyed the movement toward complete equality. For almost a century no
action was taken, and this nonaction was with the tacit approval of the courts. Then we had
Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Acts of Congress, followed by numerous
affirmative action programs. Now, we have this Court again stepping in, this time to stop
affirmative action programs of the type used by the University of California.”).
As one example, the State of Georgia framed the need for a 1757 law establishing and regulating
slave patrols as follows: “Patrols should be established under the proper Regulations in the
settled parts thereof, for the better keeping of Negroes and other Slaves in Order and
prevention of any Cabals, Insurrections or other Irregularities amongst them.” Philip L.
Reichel, Southern Slave Patrols as a Transitional Police Type, 7. AM. J. POLICE 51, 56 (1988).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4081289

Rewriting Whren v. United States

1685

which all white men belong, and were liable to active detailed duty at
regular intervals.21

It should go without saying that racially discriminatory policing has no
place in our constitutional democracy. That is precisely why many of the
procedural safeguards that undergird our modern constitutional criminal
procedure—from Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) to Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)—were a response, at least in part, to racially
selective policing.
We also recognize that this Court has, at times, favored police power over
individual rights in ways that render communities of color—and the African
American community in particular—vulnerable to police surveillance, discipline,
and social control. Our decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which
permitted police officers to stop and frisk people on the thinnest of justification
and without probable cause is one relevant example. Even so, concerns about
racially discriminatory policing have long informed much of our constitutional
criminal procedure. We refuse to jettison those concerns today.
B.
In deciding whether racially selective traffic stops are a permissible law
enforcement practice, even in the presence of probable cause of a traffic violation,
we must balance the “intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
against [the] promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”22 Under the facts
of this case, we find it quite clear that the individual’s interests outweigh those of
the government.
Rightfully, the government does not argue that it has an interest in
performing race-based traffic stops. Instead, it identifies an interest in promoting
public safety through the enforcement of its traffic laws. Although valid, this
interest deserves minimal deference when, as here, plainclothes officers
contravene departmental policy to enforce a minor traffic infraction that posed a
minimal risk to public safety.
In contrast, the individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy interests in
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures are significant. The
government implies that a traffic stop, even when racially motivated, “poses only

21.
22.

W. E. B. Du Bois, Crime and Slavery, in SOME NOTES ON NEGRO CRIME, PARTICULARLY IN
GEORGIA 2, 3 (W. E. B. Du Bois ed., 1904).
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
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a modest intrusion on the motorist’s privacy interests.”23 This characterization
misunderstands the qualitatively distinct intrusion caused by racially selective
police conduct—traffic stop or otherwise, probable cause or not.
To begin, racially selective policing compromises privacy and dignity by
rendering its targets public spectacles, “something exhibited to view; . . . a
remarkable or noteworthy sight; an object of curiosity or contempt.”24 Exposure
to this form of racial humiliation undermines one’s personal sense of security,
rendering them insecure in their own “person.”25 Indeed, widespread accounts of
racial profiling often highlight the stigma and humiliation that derive from what
people experience as a form of public shaming.26 The apparent ubiquity of racial
profiling has engendered a pithy if demoralizing turn of phrase: “driving while
Black.”27
At its core, racial profiling is pernicious precisely because it legitimizes the
idea that one racial group’s privacy, dignity, and security may be sacrificed for the
“greater good”—a sacrifice that others are never asked, nor expected, to bear. That
sacrifice can only be considered the “greater” good if you do not account for those
experiencing the harm.
In the present context, the greater good is the so-called “war on drugs”—a
now decades-long and bipartisan campaign ostensibly intended to combat illegal
drug use in America. Crude stereotypes link drug use, criminality, and violence to
African Americans—often fueled by racialized representations in media and
public discourse. That, in turn, has fueled the proliferation of “drug courier
profiles” that explicitly and implicitly view Blackness as a proxy for suspicion.

23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

Brief for the United States at 9, Whren, 517 U.S. (No. 95-5841).
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2188 (3d ed. 1986).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (observing
that “[t]he basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment . . . is to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials”).
We note that our dissenting colleagues’ concern about the stigma and racial resentment sown
from racial classifications does not appear to have entered their consideration of the racial
profiling concerns at issue here. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
493 (1989) (“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are
strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and
lead to a politics of racial hostility.”).
Just last year, prominent scholar and Harvard University professor Henry Louis Gates
reflected on this creature of contemporary America by remarking that “[t]here’s a moving
violation that many African-Americans know as D.W.B.: Driving While Black.” Henry Louis
Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, NEW YORKER, Oct. 23, 1995, at 59.
Washington Post columnist Michael A. Fletcher also recently documented the great lengths
Black men will go to avoid being stopped for what some “sardonically call DWB—driving
while black.” Michael A. Fletcher, Driven to Extremes, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at A1.
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Meanwhile, white people effectively enjoy racial immunity from the drug
war, despite evidence that all racial groups use drugs in roughly equal
proportions.28 Accordingly, in the name of public safety,29 law enforcement
departments across the country disproportionately stop and search African
Americans not because of their conduct nor the content of their character, but
because of the color of their skin.30
Were we to condone racial profiling as a “rational” and legitimate law
enforcement tactic, it would do more than compromise the privacy interests of the
individuals profiled. Racial profiling of any sort undermines the egalitarian
principles enshrined in our Constitution—principles from which we have too
often strayed—and furthers the perception of African Americans as a criminally
suspect group. When police use racial stereotypes to guide and justify their
investigation practices, they reinforce the stereotypes’ perceived descriptive
accuracy and moral acceptability: Police are more likely engage African
Americans, and in turn, the police and public are more likely to view African
Americans as criminally suspect. This reinforcing spiral lends moral credence to
using stereotypes as a driver of public policy.
In addition, racially selective policing has resulted in racially-disparate
collateral damage across all dimensions of our criminal justice system—from stops
and arrests, to incarceration and sentencing.31 This does not even begin to describe
the collateral consequences—from potential disenfranchisement to exclusion
from housing and employment—that follow individuals post-arrest and
incarceration. Dispiritingly, the “logic” of racial profiling often goes

28.

29.
30.

31.

See Nanette Graham, The Influence of Predictors on Adolescent Drug Use: An Examination
of Individual Effects, 28 YOUTH & SOC’Y 215, 217, 227 (1996) (noting that “Blacks report
less drug use than do Whites” and finding that “Whites were found to be significantly higher
than Blacks on cigarette, alcohol, and marijuana use . . . . On the other hand, Blacks, although
not significantly different, were found to be higher than Whites on cocaine and heroin use”);
Alison M. Trinkoff, Christian Ritter & James C. Anthony, The Prevalence and Self-Reported
Consequences of Cocaine Use: An Exploratory and Descriptive Analysis, 26 DRUG AND
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 217, 219–20 (1990) (concluding that cocaine use is more prevalent
among white people than Black people); Dan Weikel, War on Crack Targets Minorities Over
Whites, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at A1, A26.
Rarely do we question whose “public safety” we intend to protect.
Two years before the Los Angeles Uprisings that followed the Rodney King beating, Los
Angeles Times reporter Ron Harris remarked that “[m]aybe no one planned it, maybe no one
wanted it and certainly few saw it coming, but around the country, politicians, public officials
and even many police officers and judges say, the nation’s war on drugs has in effect become a
war on black people.” Ron Harris, Blacks Feel Brunt of Drug War, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1990, at
A1.
See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, 3–4
(1995).
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unquestioned, despite evidence that the growing disparities in our criminal justice
system are not caused by actual behavioral differences across racial groups.32
Though we have focused our attention on Black Americans, they are far from
the only racialized group to face state-sanctioned profiling in the name of public
safety and national security. In the 1940s, drawing upon wartime “hysteria,”33 the
United States Government—including this Court—took us into “the ugly abyss of
racism” when it incarcerated Japanese Americans on the racial assumption that
they were, or were likely to be, disloyal.34 Americans of German and Italian
ancestry, in contrast, remained free from such unindividuated treatment,
notwithstanding that Germany and Italy also constituted wartime adversaries.
Under the guise of “strictly scrutinizing” Japanese internment, this Court did
not simply acquiesce, but affirmatively defended anti-Japanese racism. Forty years
later in Brignoni-Ponce, we revived this ignoble tradition by holding that the
government may employ a person’s “apparent Mexican ancestry” as one factor
among many in determining whether that person is, to use the dehumanizing
term, an “illegal alien.”35 Without even applying strict scrutiny, our decision
expressly incorporated racial discrimination into Fourth Amendment law. We see
no compelling reason—indeed, not even a rational one—to compound those
errors here.
The dissent, for its part, describes the underlying traffic stop as “run-of-themine”—a phrase apparently intended to capture its supposed reasonableness and
banal character. Yet if true, this only proves our point: Racial profiling has become
so ingrained in the fabric of American policing that it is rendered ordinary, and
therefore constitutionally reasonable, in the eyes of Supreme Court Justices.
Tragically, this is not the first time members of this Court have cited racism’s
ordinary and everyday nature to justify its constitutionalization. Whether

32.

33.
34.
35.

Justice Stevens recently made this point, gesturing to a 1995 Special Report to Congress that
contained the following noteworthy facts. In 1993, although 65 percent of persons who had
used crack are white, whites represented only 4 percent of federal offenders convicted of
trafficking crack; 88 percent of those convicted were Black. Justice Stevens’s observations find
additional support in a Bureau of Justice Statistics study that suggests that sentencing
disparities grew dramatically after the implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines. These
“presumably reliable,” as Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, statistics belie any suggestion that
disparities in arrest, conviction, or sentencing naturally and reasonably reflect disparities in
criminality. To the contrary, they reflect “troubling racial patterns of enforcement.” United
States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 479–80 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED PART 2: RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (1983) (“The broad historical causes which shaped
these decisions were race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of political leadership.”).
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877, 886–87 (1975) (emphasis added).
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ordinary or not, racial profiling constitutes the antithesis of “evenhanded law
enforcement.”36
It seems plain wrong that the Fourth Amendment, which is intended to
ensure that police conduct is reasonable, would invite, let alone permit a rule that
inoculates racially discriminatory policing—including discrimination rooted in
racial animus—from constitutional scrutiny. At least since Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), we would not have thought it necessary nor
controversial to assert that racism is, by definition, unreasonable.37 Racial
discrimination does not become reasonable just because the officer possesses
probable cause of a traffic infraction. Indeed, we have repeatedly struck down
laws or policies as unreasonable because they discriminated based on race.38
Accordingly, we find it untenable to adopt a rule that would make racial
discrimination constitutionally reasonable.
The dissent disagrees, apparently. It insists that it is not asking us to ignore
our constitutional commitment to racial equality. Rather, it argues that the proper
constitutional provision to contest racially discriminatory policing is the
Fourteenth Amendment—not the Fourth.39
We agree that a claim of racial discrimination is colorable under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
But conduct
impermissible under one Amendment is not therefore permissible under
another. Any instance of police misconduct could potentially give rise to
multiple constitutional claims, arising under distinct constitutional
provisions. This is particularly true in the realm of constitutional criminal
procedure, which rests on multiple constitutional anchors. Consider a
criminal defendant, who could appropriately seek to suppress the same

36.
37.
38.

39.

Brief for the United States at 14, Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (No. 95-5841)
(quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990)).
But, apparently, we must make this point explicit, particularly given the array of law
enforcement officials, politicians, and academics who profess that racially discriminatory
policies and practices are both rational and constitutionally reasonable.
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190 (1964) (“Classification ‘must always rest
upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which
the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily, and without any such basis.’”)
(quoting Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fé Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897)).
As a preliminary matter, it is not clear to us how the Fourteenth Amendment applies to this
case, since the Government conduct in question does not implicate a state, but rather the
Metropolitan Police Department. The relevant constitutional provision would be the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which itself incorporates the equal protection guarantees
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, for purposes of this opinion we
assume that the Equal Protection Clause applies, as it does to most criminal procedure cases
before this Court.
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incriminating statement under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth
Amendments.
Petitioners need not cede their Fourth Amendment protections simply
because they may find recourse under the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, we
find it hard to understand how police conduct that would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment would be considered reasonable under the Fourth. If anything, the
fact that racially discriminatory policing raises a cognizable Fourteenth
Amendment claim suggests the opposite.
First, we have historically interpreted the Constitution as a unified
document, rather than as a series of disaggregated provisions.40 On this view, by
rendering racially discriminatory stops reasonable, notwithstanding the clear
Fourteenth Amendment violation, we would untether the Fourth Amendment
from the rest of the constitutional fabric. Such a conclusion would signal that the
Fourth Amendment is neither concerned with, nor informed by, other
constitutional safeguards.
Second, the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection concerns are
particularly applicable to our interpretation of the Fourth Amendment—perhaps
far more than other constitutional provisions.41 Whatever the Fourth
Amendment’s initial scope, the Fourteenth Amendment infused it with an
equality dimension—one acutely attentive to America’s disgraceful treatment of
Black Americans—that informs our contemporary reasonableness inquiry.42 A
holistic reading of these two amendments suggests that, at minimum, one subset
40.

41.

42.

See, e.g., United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“National
security cases, moreover, often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values
not present in cases of ‘ordinary’ crime.”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961) (Black, J.,
concurring) (“Reflection on the problem . . . has led me to conclude that when the Fourth
Amendment’s ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the
Fifth Amendment’s ban against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges
which not only justifies but actually requires the exclusionary rule.”).
It is worth noting that a reasonableness inquiry commonly guides our equal protection
analysis. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 47 (1973) (rejecting
the District Court’s conclusion that Texas “had failed . . . ‘to establish a reasonable basis for a
system that results in different levels of per-pupil expenditure”). And across bodies of law that
transcend the Constitution, reasonableness has historically been understood in terms of
whether conduct is otherwise lawful or constitutional. See, e.g., Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Carl,
227 U.S. 639, 650 (1913) (employing reasonableness analysis to assess the lawfulness of a
shipping contract).
John Ely has remarked that “the Fourth Amendment can be seen as another harbinger of the
Equal Protection Clause, concerned with avoiding indefensible inequities in treatment.” JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 97 (1980). This is not to suggest that racial
discrimination was not previously a concern of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, it is to mark
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage reinvigorated the Fourth Amendment with a
normative commitment that compels our rejection of a jurisprudence that views racial
discrimination as constitutionally reasonable.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4081289

Rewriting Whren v. United States

1691

of unreasonable searches and seizures are those conducted in a racially
discriminatory manner.
Third, the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which—similar to the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause—contains an antidiscrimination dimension.43
Time and again, we have reiterated that racial discrimination violates due process.
For example, in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), which principally concerned
the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, we remarked that
“[t]he right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds . . . is indeed so
fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of
law.”44 Cooper is but one example of our well-established understanding that due
process and equal protection are distinct yet overlapping and intertwined
principles rooted in “our American ideal of fairness.”45
The dissent’s approach, however, would effectively “incorporate” racism into
the Due Process Clause and put the Fourteenth Amendment at war with itself,
pitting its Equal Protection Clause against its Due Process Clause.46 Perhaps this
explains why our dissenting colleagues never state explicitly that racially targeted
stops are constitutionally reasonable if conducted under the guise of enforcing
traffic laws. Not once does the dissent utter the words “racial discrimination,”
“racialized policing,” “racism,” or “white supremacy.” Instead, the dissent
sanitizes its approach and obscures how it would constitutionally internalize
racial discrimination by speaking in terms of “actual motivations,” “ulterior
motives,” “subjective intentions,” and “probable cause.”
Consider the dissent’s own reasoning:
“Here the District Court found that the officers had probable cause to
believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code. That rendered the
stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence thereby
discovered admissible, and the upholding of the convictions by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit correct.”

On its face, race is absent from the dissent’s proposed rule. But make no
mistake, this approach would endorse racial profiling: If a police officer observes
A and B committing the same traffic infraction (and therefore has probable cause
43.
44.
45.
46.

See Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 591 (1896) (“The guarantees of life, liberty, and
property are for all persons, within the jurisdiction of the United States, or of any state, without
discrimination against any because of their race.”).
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
We see no good reason nor need to generate such tension. Doing so would uplift a vision of
the Fourth Amendment inconsistent with our Constitution’s unambiguous mandate that its
rights and protections flow equally to all, irrespective of one’s race.
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to enforce the infraction), and the officer decides to target B because B is Black, the
dissent would find the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Furthermore, so long as there was probable cause of a traffic infraction, the dissent
would approve of the stop—even if the officer had no intention of enforcing the
traffic infraction, and was solely motivated by overt racism or an intent to harass
B. This approach transforms probable cause from a shield that protects the public
from arbitrary police intrusions into a sword police officers can wield to racially
discriminate.47
That this sword is not colorblind raises broader constitutional concerns. This
Court has long embraced the notion that “[o]ur Constitution is colorblind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”48 When Justice Harlan offered
that rebuke in Plessy, he did not add a proviso: “except with respect to the Fourth
Amendment.”49
We recognize that our distinguished colleagues vary in how precisely they
might adhere to our constitutional commitment to colorblindness. Competing
positions, for instance, are reflected in the Bakke opinions authored by Justices
Powell and Brennan.50 Justice Powell, writing alone for the Court, invoked
colorblindness to insist both that affirmative action must satisfy strict scrutiny, the
highest level of judicial review, and that remedying societal discrimination was not
a compelling interest sufficient to justify such a policy.
In contrast, Justice Brennan argued that affirmative action should receive
intermediate scrutiny because it was a benign use of race to further remedial ends.
From his perspective: “[W]e cannot . . . let color blindness become myopia which
masks the reality that many ‘created equal’ have been treated within our lifetimes as
inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens.”51

47.

48.
49.

50.
51.

We worry as well that were the dissent to have its day, we would open the door to arguments
that the government may formally use race as a basis for the existence of probable cause. Our
concern is not far-fetched. Two decades ago, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, this Court
held that the government may take “apparent Mexican ancestry” into account in determining
whether there is reasonable suspicion that a person has formal legal status in the United States.
422 U.S. 873, 885–87 (1975). The Court did so without even subjecting its reasoning to a strict
scrutiny analysis—the very analysis we apply to remedial uses of race. It is bad enough that
racially inflected presumptions about who is, and is not, American have been folded into our
reasonable suspicion framework. We will not facilitate the incorporation of racist lay theories
into determinations of probable cause as well.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
As we have noted throughout, there is no reason to restrict racial discrimination claims to one
constitutional provision. Just as multiple constitutional vehicles regulate when and how police
officers can question us, so does the Constitution provide multiple checks against racial
discrimination.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Id. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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We are sympathetic to Justice Brennan’s descriptive and normative
accounts. Nevertheless, as the law currently stands, any express use of race is
constitutionally suspect—even for benign or remedial purposes—and triggers
the most exacting judicial scrutiny.52 Indeed, Justice Scalia, who authors the
dissent, has been one of the most forceful proponents of this hardline approach.
Yet, here, he abandons such colorblind sensibilities in the face of racially
discriminatory policing, instead relegating them to equal protection doctrine
alone. If ever there were a context to uphold the line that our Constitution is
colorblind, we think racially selective law enforcement is it.
Accordingly, we hold that it is unreasonable for an officer to make a traffic stop
because of a motorist’s race. This is true even if the officer has probable cause of a
traffic violation.
In articulating this “because of race” standard, Fourth Amendment
litigants need not prove conscious racial motivation, the intent standard that
applies in the Fourteenth Amendment context.53 Scholars have roundly
criticized that standard for reasons with which we largely agree.54 While
evidence of conscious intent to discriminate or explicit racial animus would
certainly meet the “because of race” test we set forth here, the absence of that
showing should not preclude the finding of a Fourth Amendment violation.
In this sense, our holding is narrow: We do not decide whether the
petitioners were stopped because of their race. The District Court did not
make a factual finding on this issue, and the record is insufficient for us to do
so here. Accordingly, we remand to the District Court so that it may take up
petitioners’ racial profiling claim in the first instance. In doing so, we urge the
District Court to press the parties on the following counterfactual inquiry:
Would the officers have stopped petitioners had they been white? In

52.
53.
54.

See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324–25 (1987) (“By insisting that a blameworthy
perpetrator be found before the existence of racial discrimination can be acknowledged,
the Court creates an imaginary world where discrimination does not exist unless it was
consciously intended.”); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331
(1988); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV.
1049, 1053 (1978) (contrasting antidiscrimination law’s prevailing “perpetrator”
conception of racial discrimination—which requires litigants to identify a “blameworthy”
individual who has engaged in “intentional” discrimination—with a “victim” conception
that which suggests that the problem of racial discrimination “will not be solved until the
conditions associated with it have been eliminated”).
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answering that question, the District Court should consider, among other
factors (1) whether the officers’ conduct violated departmental policy, (2) whether
civilians have registered any complaints of racial bias or discrimination against the
officers, (3) whether the officers employed racially inflected language during the
interaction, and (4) whether there is evidence of racial disparities in the rate at
which officers in the department stop people for traffic infractions. We express
no view as to how courts should weigh these factors, nor do we present them as
exhaustive. We simply note that each is relevant to the “because of race” test
we have described.

C.
We now turn to petitioners’ pretext argument.
In recent years, this Court has examined several cases involving officers
searching an impounded vehicle while taking inventory of the vehicle’s contents.
Just six years ago, in Florida v. Wells,55 we stated that “an inventory search must not
be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence,”
and that “[t]he individual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude that
inventory searches are turned into a ‘purposeful and general means of discovering
evidence of crime.’” That passage quoted Justice Blackman’s concurrence in
Colorado v. Bertine,56 which we decided just three years earlier. In approving the
inventory search in Bertine, we thought it significant that there was “no showing
that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or
for the sole purpose of investigation.”57
That same year we upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless
administrative inspection in New York v. Burger.58 We observed that New York
was not employing the underlying administrative scheme “as a ‘pretext’ to enable
law enforcement . . . [to investigate] penal violations.”59 And there was “no reason
to believe that the instant inspection was actually a ‘pretext’ for obtaining evidence
of respondent’s violation of the penal laws.”60

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
479 U.S. 367 (1987).
Id. at 372.
482 U.S. 691, 716–18 (1987).
Id. at 716 n.27.
Id. See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (upholding an inventory
search of an impounded car because “there is no suggestion whatever that this . . . was a pretext
concealing an investigatory police motive”).
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In each of the preceding cases we either explicitly or implicitly recognized
that pretextual searches could violate the Fourth Amendment. Our dissenting
colleagues do not quarrel with that conclusion. Instead, they perceive what they
believe is an important distinction: In those cases, unlike here, the government
lacked any probable cause. According to the dissent, this distinction makes all the
difference:
[O]nly an undiscerning reader would regard [the inventory] cases as
endorsing the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police
conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a
violation of law has occurred. In each case we were addressing the
validity of a search conducted in the absence of probable cause. Our
quoted statements simply explain that the exemption from the need for
probable cause (and warrant), which is accorded to searches made for
the purpose of inventory or administrative regulation, is not accorded
to searches that are not made for those purposes.61

Formally, the dissent is entirely right. Unlike the inventory or
administrative search cases in which the government typically lacks probable
cause, the D.C. vice officers undisputedly had probable cause to believe that
petitioners committed multiple traffic infractions. Substantively, however, the
dissent identifies a distinction without a difference.
Given the catalogue of traffic code regulations in any given city, it is
virtually impossible to drive a car without committing some infraction.62 The
D.C. traffic code, as the following regulations reflect, is no exception:
The driver of a vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely
than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of the
vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the roadway; both
the approach for a right turn and a right turn shall be made as close as
practicable to the right-hand curb or edge or the roadway; no person
shall start a vehicle which is stopped, standing, or parked unless and
until the movement can be made with reasonable safety; an operator
shall, when operating a vehicle, give full time and attention to the
operation of the vehicle; a signal of intention to turn right or left when
required shall be given continuously during not less than the last one
hundred feet (100 ft.) traveled by the vehicle before turning; no vehicle

61.
62.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–12 (1996).
Justice Scalia has previously acknowledged the breath of common traffic laws, having noted
that “[w]e know that no local police force can strictly enforce the traffic laws, or it would arrest
half the driving population on any given morning.” Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727–28
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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operated on the highways of the District shall have any object attached
to or suspended from the rearview mirror or rearview mirror
bracket.63

Considering the sprawling traffic codes in D.C. and elsewhere, only in the most
formalistic sense does a probable cause requirement constrain a police officer’s
power to stop a motorist. Thus, while inventory searches are suspicion-less
police intrusions in a de jure sense (police officers need no objective suspicion
to conduct inventory searches), traffic stops are suspicion-less police intrusions
in a de facto sense (the formal probable cause requirement does not, in practice,
constrain an officer’s authority to conduct a traffic stop).64 For this reason, the
inventory cases and their pretext analyses are more relevant to the present case
than the dissent suggests. Critically, not a single one of the foregoing decisions
confined our concerns about pretextual police intrusions only to those instances
where officers lacked probable cause, or only to the inventory and administrative
search context.65
Accordingly, we find that our inventory and investigatory precedents are
relevant to the question at hand. We do not suggest, however, that our decision is
underpinned by these cases alone. In addition to this body of law, the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement that we balance parties’ interests—the government’s
law enforcement interests against people’s interest in privacy and security—weighs
against pretextual stops.

63.
64.

65.

D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18 §§ 2201.9, 2203.3, 2206.1, 2213.4, 2204.4, 2213.7 (1995).
Nearly 25 years ago, Justice Marshall articulated similar concerns about pretextual stops. See
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“There is always
the possibility that a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search warrant, will use a
traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search. I suggest this possibility not to impugn the
integrity of our police, but merely to point out that case-by-case adjudication will always be
necessary to determine whether a full arrest was effected for purely legitimate reasons or,
rather, as a pretext for searching the arrestee. ‘An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search
for evidence.’” (citations omitted)).
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215 (1981) (noting that an arrest warrant for one party
is not a surrogate to search a third party’s home and that a warrant may not serve as a “pretext
for entering a home in which the police have a suspicion, but not probable cause to believe, that
illegal activity is taking place”); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932) (holding
that an arrest warrant “may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence”); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 500 (1958) (suppressing evidence where “testimony of the federal officers
makes clear beyond dispute that their purpose in entering was to search . . . not to arrest”); New
York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 122 n. (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (police officer may enter car
to obtain VIN, but “an officer may not use VIN inspection as a pretext for searching a vehicle
for contraband or weapons”); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983) (upholding evidence
obtained at a roadblock where “[t]he circumstances of this meeting . . . give no suggestion that
the roadblock was a pretext whereby evidence of narcotics violation might be uncovered”).
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As we noted above, probable cause is often sufficient to establish that a stop
or search is reasonable. The government proposes that probable cause is always
sufficient. As attractive as this proposed rule may be to the government, it
contravenes our Fourth Amendment precedent and principles. Specifically, it
conflicts with our prior command that, in determining whether a search or
seizure is reasonable, we consider “all of the circumstances surrounding the
search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself.”66 Even when
probable cause exists, we must balance the “intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against [the] promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”67
As with racially selective stops, the government does not claim to possess an
affirmative interest in pretextual stops. Instead, it again describes its interest as
promoting public safety through the enforcement of its traffic laws. This interest
is legitimate.
We think it beyond dispute, however, that the public safety interest is only
minimally advanced by having plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles
investigate minor traffic infractions. Indeed, the Metropolitan Police
Department’s own regulations prohibit such a practice except when the
underlying conduct is “so grave that it poses and [sic] immediate threat” to the
safety of others.68 It may in fact hinder the underlying public safety goals by
producing motorist confusion and alarm.
In contrast to the government’s legitimate but limited interest, the individual
burden is significant. The Fourth Amendment “guarantees the privacy, dignity,
and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the
Government or those acting at their direction.”69 Even ordinary traffic stops entail
“a possibly unsettling show of authority.”70 At best, traffic stops “interfere with
freedom of movement, are inconvenient, and consume time.”71 At worst, they
“create substantial anxiety” and can, in the most unfortunate circumstances, lead to
injury or even death.72 Such anxieties are no doubt more pronounced when a stop
is conducted by plainclothes officers in unmarked cars. Under such circumstances,
66.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (citation omitted); see also
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967) (“[W]hether a search and seizure is unreasonable
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case”).
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (quoting United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462
U.S. 579, 588 (1983)).
METRO. POLICE DEP’T, WASH., D.C., GENERAL ORDER 303.1, at pt.1(A)(2)(a)(4) (1992).
Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989) (citations omitted).
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 657 (1979).
Id.
Id.
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we find it reasonable for a driver—let alone a jury—to suspect that a stop was
motivated by something other than a simple traffic infraction.
Our dissenting colleagues would have us refrain from balancing the parties’
interests altogether. They contend that “[w]ith rare exceptions not applicable
here . . . the result of [Fourth Amendment] balancing is not in doubt where the
search or seizure is based upon probable cause.” Those “rare exceptions,” they say,
concern searches or seizures conducted in an “extraordinary manner.” Specifically,
the dissent reads our case law as follows:
Where probable cause has existed, the only cases in which we have
found it necessary actually to perform the “balancing” analysis involved
searches or seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually
harmful to an individual’s privacy or even physical interests—such as,
for example, seizure by means of deadly force, see Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985), unannounced entry into a home, see Wilson v.
Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), entry into a home without a warrant, see
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), or physical penetration of the
body, see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). The making of a traffic
stop out of uniform does not remotely qualify as such an extreme
practice, and so is governed by the usual rule that probable cause to
believe the law has been broken “outbalances” private interest in
avoiding police contact.73

We do not read our precedent so narrowly. To begin, we have never suggested
that balancing is relevant only in the absence of probable cause, and we decline to
do so here. Nor have we ever articulated, much less adopted, the dissent’s
“extraordinary manner” standard as a basis for determining when balancing is
necessary or appropriate. It is true that we have not previously performed balancing
in a case quite like this. But that simply reflects that in several relevant respects, this
case presents a matter of first impression. And as such, we see no reason to retreat
from the view that “the balancing of competing interests” is a “key principle of the
Fourth Amendment.”74
Even if we apply the dissent’s newly devised standard, we find that this case is
“extraordinary.” The question presented implicates critical issues of police power
and discretion: Is it reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for officers to stop a
person to investigate a crime for which they lack probable cause (or, as discussed
above, to engage in racial profiling), so long as they have probable cause that the
person committed a traffic violation? Answering this question by balancing the

73.
74.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 219 (1979)).
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parties’ interests is not only appropriate, but necessary to address the intersecting
privacy, dignitary, and security harms present in pretextual and racially predicated
stops.
We find ourselves compelled to remind our colleagues that concerns about
abuse of discretion and police authority are not throwaway lines in our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. To the contrary, they anchor this body of law.
Specifically, we have stated that “persons in automobiles on public roadways
may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at
the unbridled discretion of police officers.”75 This statement echoes our
historic understanding that the Fourth Amendment is skeptical of unbridled
law enforcement discretion.76
We are unable to see how a regime that permits pretextual traffic stops under
the veil of probable cause aligns with these basic principles. Given the ubiquity of
traffic infractions, the government’s proposed rule would afford officers discretion
to single out and stop whomever they wish, whenever they wish, wherever they
wish.77 If unchecked, such discretion would invite arbitrary and capricious
decisions, including racially selective ones, about whom to stop—affording
officers the very “unconstrained discretion” that the Fourth Amendment is
designed to prevent.78 We decline to adopt a standard that would doctrinally
sanction such an abuse of police power.
Reaching the contrary conclusion would come dangerously close to
legitimizing the precise kind of suspicion-less traffic stop that we declared
unconstitutional in Prouse. There, we cautioned that “[w]ere the individual
subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an
automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be

75.
76.
77.

78.

Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
See id. at 661 (“This kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court
has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the
field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.”).
The dissent contends that “we are aware of no principle that would allow us to decide at what
point a code of law becomes so expansive and so commonly violated that infraction itself
can no longer be the ordinary measure of the lawfulness of enforcement. And even if we
could identify such exorbitant codes, we do not know by what standard (or what right) we
would decide, as petitioners would have us do, which particular provisions are sufficiently
important to merit enforcement.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 818–19. The dissent would make this
case harder than it is. Nothing in our opinion alters the authority of police to enforce the
full breath of the traffic and vehicle regulations within their jurisdiction. We merely hold
that in so doing, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police officers from weaponizing
probable cause of a traffic infraction into pretext to investigate a crime for which probable
cause is lacking.
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661.
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seriously circumscribed.”79 To put it finely, permitting law enforcement to
perform pretextual stops risks subjecting every driver to “unfettered governmental
intrusion every time” they drive.80
What, then, is our standard for determining whether an officer has employed
a traffic stop pretextually? We think that the appropriate inquiry asks whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable police officer would have
conducted the traffic stop. This is consistent both with our preceding race
discrimination analysis and this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence more
broadly.
The dissent contends that this reasonableness inquiry is unmanageable
because it would require us “to plumb the collective consciousness of law
enforcement.”81 To the extent that is true, our test is no less manageable than the
numerous totality of the circumstances frameworks scattered across our
jurisprudence, including earlier Fourth Amendment decisions.82 For example, to
determine whether a person was seized, courts must ask whether, under the

79.

80.

81.
82.

Id. at 662–63. Of course, there are distinctions between Prouse and the case before us.
Unlike in Prouse, we assume that the officers here possessed probable cause to stop
petitioners. But as we have explained, police officers will almost always possess probable
cause in the traffic stop context. For this reason, Prouse’s core logic extends to this case.
We parenthetically note one additional reason to conclude that pretextual stops are
unreasonable under Fourth Amendment law. Pretextual stops contravene our Fourth
Amendment concerns about scope. Consider the following. Whereas reasonable suspicion
that a person is armed and dangerous would permit an officer to frisk that person for weapons,
reasonable suspicion does not permit that same officer to conduct an exploratory search into
that person’s pocket for drugs. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Similarly, while probable cause of criminal activity is
generally sufficient to justify an arrest, probable cause does not justify seizing a person by
shooting them dead. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). See also Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816–17 (1985). And
while a warrant might afford an officer the right to search every room in a house for a stolen
television, that same warrant may not justify an exploratory search of cabinets for drugs. See
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466–67. In this case, the government is effectively asking this Court to
permit police officers to broaden the scope of the purpose for a particular seizure—a traffic
stop—without broadening the underlying justification. Under the government’s rule,
probable cause of a traffic infraction would permit an officer to stop a motorist to investigate a
wholly unrelated reason for which no objective suspicion exists. Probable cause that a driver
violated traffic laws authorizes the police to conduct a stop for that—but not some other—
purpose. Stopping the person for an unrelated reason, and one that lacks the predicate level of
objective suspicion, shares material traits with an officer who looks through medicine cabinets
when the warrant authorizes a search for a television, or conducts a full search of a person when
that officer has only reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous. In each
instance, the officer has exceeded the scope justified by the objective evidence.
Whren, 517 U.S. at 815.
The search inquiry is also, effectively, a totality of the circumstances analysis in which we ask
whether the government intrudes upon an expectation of privacy that society deems
legitimate. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would feel free to leave or
otherwise terminate the encounter.83 We have applied variations of this standard
for more than a decade, and not once has any Justice on this Court criticized the
“free to leave” framework for requiring us “to plumb the collective consciousness”
of lay people. Moreover, it is worth noting that several lower courts have already
applied our proposed standard—seemingly without issue.84
The facts of this case—including Officer Soto’s admission that he never
intended to issue a traffic ticket to the petitioners—leave significant doubt that a
reasonable officer would have stopped petitioners for the identified traffic
violations except as a pretext for investigating drugs. We have seen no evidence
that plainclothes vice officers would have stopped the vehicle; the violations were
minor; there was no identified threat to public safety; and the stop itself
contravened departmental policy.
Nevertheless, we refrain from deciding whether a pretextual stop occurred in
this case. The District Court made no finding on this issue and the Court of
Appeals rested its decision on the view that petitioners’ pretext claim is not
cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. On remand, the District Court should
evaluate the pretext question, along with the question of racially selective stops,
consistent with the standard articulated herein.

83.
84.

See Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); Florida v. Bostick, 501
U.S. 429 (1991).
See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying “would have”
test where defendant was stopped for not wearing seatbelt and charged with possession of
cocaine); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying “would have” test
where defendant was stopped for weaving based on officer’s hunch that vehicle was carrying
drugs).
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